

Hash Encryption in Windows 10 Anniversary Update

© 2016 Passcape Software
Passcape Software

1. Abstract	3
2. Hash Encryption in Windows 10 Anniversary Update	3
3. Conclusion	6

1 Abstract

Microsoft recently introduced a large anniversary update for Windows 10, one of its most popular operating systems.

Windows 10 Anniversary Update makes Windows 10 better than ever before. You can enjoy a multitude of new features, including:

- shuffle buttons in the Start menu
- take advantage of additional highly requested adware
- resize and reshape the adorable tiles
- admire how fast your personal data is sent to Microsoft
- try a brilliant monochrome skin for those suffering from moon blindness
- view brand new minimalistic icons developed by thousands of hard-working UI designers
- spend even more time searching for system options across multiple windows, thus raising the bar for your extrasensory perception

In all seriousness, however, the update does actually introduce some important improvements that deserve our attention. These include a Linux shell, pure re-installation, improved intelligence in Cortana, new login options based on Windows Hello, and much more.

The funny thing is that, despite the fact that the standard login workflow of Windows 10 has been slightly changed, this is not mentioned in the release notes at all. Due to these slight, yet significant changes, most hacker tools for pulling password hashes out of Windows will not work anymore. These changes may have been motivated by Microsoft's desire to discontinue support for legacy and vulnerable cryptographic algorithms. In our example, Microsoft has decided to discontinue support for RC4. Luckily, the latest version of [Windows Password Recovery](#) that is used for auditing Windows security has already got support for new SAM encryption scheme.

2 Hash Encryption in Windows 10 Anniversary Update

According to Microsoft, user passwords are stored as hashes (instead of plain-text representation) that can be accessed in the corresponding section of the Windows registry (only by the system itself):

HKLM/SAM/SAM/Domains/Account/users/<RID>/V.

Where <RID> - is the unique user ID.

Unique user IDs can be figured out by scanning the following registry tree:

HKLM/SAM/SAM/Domains/Account/users/names/<NAME>

Each key containing a username is associated with a corresponding RID. For example, the RID of the Administrator account is always equal to 500 (0x1F4 in the hexadecimal notation), while the Guest's RID is 501 (0x1F5).

Any user's registry key also holds at least 'C' and 'V' records. A 'V' record contains the variable-length data that corresponds to this account. The names themselves seem to be abbreviations – 'V' stands for 'variable' and 'C' means 'constant.' Each variable in the 'V' records is represented as a constant within the interval from 0 to 0xCC, e.g. a username is encoded as 0xC. Therefore, if we know the constant, we can identify an offset to the index that refers to actual data. LM and NT hashes correspond to 0x9C and 0xA8 respectively. However, obtaining the final password hash will require several additional decryption steps.

	0001	0203	0405	0607	0809	0A0B	0C0D	0E0F	0123456789ABCDEF
0x000	0000	0000	F400	0000	0300	0100	F400	0000ô.....ô...
0x010	1A00	0000	0000	0000	1001	0000	0000	0000
0x020	0000	0000	1001	0000	6C00	0000	0000	00001.....
0x030	7C01	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	7C01	0000
0x040	0000	0000	0000	0000	7C01	0000	0000	0000
0x050	0000	0000	7C01	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
0x060	7C01	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	7C01	0000
0x070	0000	0000	0000	0000	7C01	0000	0000	0000
0x080	0000	0000	7C01	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000
0x090	7C01	0000	0800	0000	0100	0000	8401	0000
0x0A0	1800	0000	0000	0000	9C01	0000	3800	00008.....
0x0B0	0000	0000	D401	0000	1800	0000	0000	0000ô.....
0x0C0	EC01	0000	1800	0000	0000	0000	0100	1480	i.....
0x0D0	D400	0000	E400	0000	1400	0000	4400	0000	ô...ä.....D...
0x0E0	0200	3000	0200	0000	02C0	1400	4400	0501	..0.....À..D...
0x0F0	0101	0000	0000	0001	0000	0000	02C0	1400À..
0x100	FFFF	1F00	0101	0000	0000	0005	0700	0000	ÿÿ.....
0x110	0200	9000	0400	0000	0000	1400	5B03	0200[.....
0x120	0101	0000	0000	0001	0000	0000	0000	1800
0x130	FF07	0F00	0102	0000	0000	0005	2000	0000	ÿ.....
0x140	2002	0000	0000	3800	1B03	0200	010A	00008.....
0x150	0000	000F	0300	0000	0004	0000	DEA2	2867Ë(g
0x160	213E	D2AF	19AD	5D79	B0C1	0729	2756	FC20	!>ô-.]y°Á.)'Vü
0x170	D8AD	66F6	10F2	68FA	DF2A	F80F	0000	2400	ø-fô.òhúß*ø...\$.
0x180	4400	0200	0105	0000	0000	0005	1500	0000	D.....
0x190	DD30	4FC3	8766	1B73	CC43	79F4	F401	0000	-J Ñ-#i×0.øÈô...
0x1A0	0102	0000	0000	0005	2000	0000	2002	0000
0x1B0	0102	0000	0000	0005	2000	0000	2002	0000
0x1C0	4100	6400	6D00	6900	6E00	6900	7300	7400	A.d.m.i.n.i.s.t.
0x1D0	7200	6100	7400	6F00	7200	6424	4200	7500	r.a.t.o.r.d\$B.u.
0x1E0	6900	6C00	7400	2D00	6900	6E00	2000	6100	i.l.t.-i.n. a.
0x1F0	6300	6300	6F00	7500	6E00	7400	2000	6600	c.c.o.u.n.t. f.
0x200	6F00	7200	2000	6100	6400	6D00	6900	6E00	o.r. a.d.m.i.n.
0x210	6900	7300	7400	6500	7200	6900	6E00	6700	i.s.t.e.r.i.n.g.
0x220	2000	7400	6800	6500	2000	6300	6F00	6D00	.t.h.e. c.o.m.
0x230	7000	7500	7400	6500	7200	2F00	6400	6F00	p.u.t.e.r./d.o.
0x240	6D00	6100	6900	6E00	0102	0000	0700	0000	m.a.i.n.....
0x250	0100	0200	0000	0000	A10B	0D1F	D21D	B9CC;...ô.î
0x260	7A05	9F01	ADDC	1FE3	0100	0200	1000	0000	z...ü.ä.....
0x270	DB5E	9E14	8282	499B	72C6	AD87	4155	B0F6	Û~. I rE- AU°ø
0x280	EE5C	E0B7	C998	6D28	4792	D1C0	9D14	240C	î\à-É m(G NÀ .\$.
0x290	C47C	53CB	50BC	348D	4F3D	3208	948A	99DD	Ä SËP4 O=2. Ý
0x2A0	0100	0200	0000	0000	56B0	2CF8	3122	B913V°,ø1"¹.
0x2B0	047D	D1CB	D164	86CA	0100	0200	0000	0000	.}ÑÑd È.....
0x2C0	DD30	4FC3	8766	1B73	CC43	79F4	FE01	9A0D	Ý00Ä f.sÏCyøp. .

Indexes

Variable offset

Variable size

Variable data

Let's see how the system generally retrieves the NTLM hash of a user:

1. First of all, the system identifies a path to the key in the Windows registry where the account settings are stored, e.g. **HKLM/SAM/SAM/Domains/Account/Users/00001F4**

2. The next step is to read the variable that contains the NTLM hash. This variable corresponds to the constant 0xA8. The system thus reads the data index based on the offset in this constant, i.e. 0x19C. Adding the data index to 0xCC will give the offset 0x268 from which we can access the actual data (our 'raw' NTLM hash) as shown in the picture. Now the system can read the hash and decrypt it.
3. Using **SYSKEY**, the system decrypts the SAM session key. The SAM session key is stored in the registry section called **HKLM/SAM/SAM/Domains/Account/V**. This data structure actually keeps two encryption keys: the current one and the previous one. In this step, the system uses the **MD5** and **RC4** algorithms. In Windows 10 Anniversary Update, RC4 has been replaced with **AES**.
4. The system then uses the SAM session key to decrypt the 'raw' hash obtained in Step 2 through the RC4 or AES (for Windows 10 Anniversary Update) algorithm.
5. And, finally, the data that has been obtained is transformed once again into the actual data by means of the **DES** algorithm and the user's RID as the encryption key. Now our NTLM hash is ready.

As you can see, in Windows 10 Anniversary Update the **RC4** stream cipher in Steps 3 and 4 has been replaced with the **AES** block cipher. This has led to certain changes in the data storage structure (at least because the data length in AES blocks must be multiple to 16 bytes) but has not resulted in stronger security of the operating system.

3 Conclusion

In Windows 10 AU, the encryption algorithms of SAM accounts have been changed. Did the new algorithms make password hashes safer? No. Was it worth it? Yes, since the unified changes applied to domain users as well – some of their private data was at risk of being compromised due to vulnerabilities in the legacy RC4 algorithm. However, that is another matter entirely.